Inherent Properties and Statistics with Individual Particles in Quantum Mechanics by Morganti, Matteo
This article appeared in a journal published by Elsevier. The attached
copy is furnished to the author for internal non-commercial research
and education use, including for instruction at the authors institution
and sharing with colleagues.
Other uses, including reproduction and distribution, or selling or
licensing copies, or posting to personal, institutional or third party
websites are prohibited.
In most cases authors are permitted to post their version of the
article (e.g. in Word or Tex form) to their personal website or
institutional repository. Authors requiring further information
regarding Elsevier’s archiving and manuscript policies are
encouraged to visit:
http://www.elsevier.com/copyright
Author's personal copy
Inherent properties and statistics with individual particles
in quantum mechanics
Matteo Morganti
FB Philosophie and Zukunftskolleg, University of Konstanz, Universita¨tsstraße 10, 78464 Konstanz, Germany
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 27 April 2008
Received in revised form
13 March 2009
Keywords:
Quantum
Classical
Statistics
Individuality
Indistinguishability
Holism
Monadic
Intrinsic
Relation
Disposition
Measurement
Probability
Irreducible
Inherent
a b s t r a c t
This paper puts forward the hypothesis that the distinctive features of quantum statistics are exclusively
determined by the nature of the properties it describes. In particular, all statistically relevant properties
of identical quantum particles in many-particle systems are conjectured to be irreducible, ‘inherent’
properties only belonging to the whole system. This allows one to explain quantum statistics without
endorsing the ‘Received View’ that particles are non-individuals, or postulating that quantum systems
obey peculiar probability distributions, or assuming that there are primitive restrictions on the range of
states accessible to such systems. With this, the need for an unambiguously metaphysical explanation
of certain physical facts is acknowledged and satisfied.
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0. Introduction
The claim that since quantum particles obey a non-classical
statistics they should be regarded as non-individuals, that is, as
entities lacking well-defined identities, can be found as early as
(Born, 1926). That quantum particles form aggregates of entities
that are only ordinally countable, and of which it makes no sense
to ask ‘which one is which’, has then become something like a
‘Received View’ on the matter (this claim is put forward, for
instance, in French & Krause, 2006, Chapter 3). However, there
have been attempts to show that the individuality of particles
(be it primitive or determined in agreement with some form of
the Leibnizian principle of the Identity of the Indiscernibles)
should not be sacrificed given the evidence related to quantum
statistics. As will be argued in what follows, though, these
attempts are not entirely convincing. The present paper attempts
to resist the Received View in a novel way. In particular, it will be
maintained that, whatever one’s conception of individuality is, a
ready explanation of quantum statistics can be formulated by
making a plausible assumption concerning the nature of the
properties relevant for the statistics, essentially amounting to a
generalization of some ideas expressed by Teller in the late 1980s.
Section 1 gives an outline of classical and quantum statistics,
explaining why the latter is commonly taken to force us to assume
the non-individuality of quantum particles. Section 2 considers
some existing attempts to block this inference and points out their
limitations. Section 3 puts forward an alternative proposal, based
on a form of ‘ontological revision’: namely, on the idea that all
statistically relevant properties of many-particle systems of
identical quantum particles are ‘inherent’ properties only belong-
ing to the system as a whole. Section 4 adds some remarks and
specifications, considering some potential objections and worries.
A concluding section follows.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/shpsb
Studies in History and Philosophy
of Modern Physics
1355-2198/$ - see front matter & 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.shpsb.2009.06.008
E-mail address: Matteo.Morganti@uni-konstanz.de
URL: http://www.uni-konstanz.de/zukunftskolleg/
Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 40 (2009) 223–231
Author's personal copy
ARTICLE IN PRESS
1. Classical and quantum statistics
Suppose one has N particles distributed overM possible single-
particle microstates, and is interested in knowing the number of
physically possible combinations.
In classical mechanics, Maxwell–Boltzmann statistics holds.
According to it, the number of possible distributions W is
W ¼ MN ðMBÞ
In the case of quantum particles, fewer arrangements are
available. Bose–Einstein statistics (which applies to the particles
known as bosons) has it that
W ¼ ðN þM  1Þ!N!ðM  1Þ! ðBEÞ
In the case of fermions, the Exclusion Principle (dictating that
no two fermions can be in the same state) holds and further
reduces the number of possible states, which becomes equal to
W ¼ M!=N!ðM  NÞ! ðFDÞ
The latter expresses so-called Fermi–Dirac statistics.1
Consider now a physical system composed of two entities to
each one of which two equally probable states are available
(i.e., for which M ¼ N ¼ 2). Classically, one applies (MB) and
obtains 22 ¼ 4 possible arrangements, each one with probability 14
of being realised (think, for instance, of a system composed of two
fair coins and the possible distributions of ‘heads’ and ‘tails’).
According to quantum statistics, instead, there are only either
(2+21)!/2!(21)! ¼ 3 possibilities (BE) or 2!/2!(22)! ¼ 1 pos-
sibility (FD) for systems of this type. The probabilities of occurring
for each possible configuration are 1/3 and 1, respectively.
In more detail, the arrangements available in the situation
being considered are the following (x and y being the available
states, and the subscripts denoting the entities composing the
system):
jx41jx42 ðC1 Q1Þ
jy41jy42 ðC2 Q2Þ
jx41jy42 ðC3Þ
jy41jx42 ðC4Þ
1=
ffiffiffi
2
p
ðjx41jy42 þ jy41jx42Þ ðQ3Þ
1=
ffiffiffi
2
p
ðjx41jy42  jy41jx42Þ ðQ4Þ
(C1)–(C4) are possible particle arrangements in classical
mechanics, (Q1)–(Q4) the configurations available in quantum
mechanics. In particular, (Q1)–(Q3) are symmetric states, acces-
sible to bosons, while (Q4) the unique possible state for fermions,
which is anti-symmetric.2 (Importantly, the two kinds of quantum
particles necessarily conserve their symmetry-type, i.e., there are
no transitions from a fermionic to a bosonic state or vice versa.)
Comparing the classical possibilities and their quantum
counterparts, it can immediately be noticed that in the quantum
case particle exchanges do not make a difference. This is the case, it
is generally agreed, not (only) because we could not tell which
particle is which, but because ontologically there is only one way
in which each macrostate can be realised. This is known as
Permutation Symmetry, or Indistinguishability Postulate (quan-
tum identical particles in the same system are consequently said
to be indistinguishable). Moreover, non-symmetric states do not
occur in the quantum case—that is, analogues of (C3) and (C4) for
quantum particles are never realised. All this appears problematic
for those who want to defend the individuality of particles.
Consider the impossibility of non-symmetric states: if particles
truly are individuals, why are states that would differ from
allowed ones ((Q1) and (Q2) above) only as regards which value is
exhibited by which particle not observed?3
The available evidence, the canonical argument underpinning
the Received View goes, suffices for concluding in favor of the
non-individuality of quantum particles. First, it is maintained,
particle permutations cannot in principle make a difference in
the quantum case because there are no identities that can be
permuted. Secondly, and relatedly, non-symmetric states are not
observed in the quantum domain because there it is impossible
for a specific particle to have a certain value for an observable
and for another specific one to have a different value for that
observable, as the particles do not have determinate identities
allowing for such property-attributions.
2. Attempts to avoid the conclusion
Those not willing to subscribe to the Received View on
quantum statistics must provide an alternative explanation of
the evidence. Alternatively, they will have to deny that physics,
at least as far as the case under scrutiny is concerned, should
be given a metaphysical interpretation. In this section, the three
main existing attempts to explain quantum statistics without
invoking non-individuality will be illustrated: one assumes
indistinguishability and focuses on probability measures; one
questions the equiprobability of the available states; and
one postulates primitive state-accessibility restrictions. Then, a
‘no metaphysics from the physics’ reaction will be considered.
Shortcomings in all four approaches will be pointed out. A more
promising alternative will be presented in the next section.
2.1. Indistinguishability and probability measures
One argument against the conclusion that quantum particles
must be considered non-individuals in view of their statistical
behavior relies on a particular stance that it is possible to take
with respect to the so-called ‘Gibbs paradox’. The Gibbs paradox
consists of the fact that (MB) incorrectly predicts that by mixing
similar gases at the same pressure and temperature one
experiences a change in entropy, and this requires the introduc-
tion of a N! factor excluding permutations in order to make
entropy correctly extensive.
One suggested reaction to this is that in at least some cases
classical particles are indistinguishable too, and this explains the
need to employ the ‘correct Boltzmann counting’ to overcome
Gibbs’ paradox. Saunders (2006) expands on this in some detail,
exploiting the resulting picture for an explanation of quantum
statistics.
1 This tri-partition of types of statistics on the basis of types of particles may
be disputed, for example by claiming that classical systems obeying Bose-Einstein
statistics are both theoretically and, it seems, practically possible (see, for instance,
Gottesman, 2007). However, it looks as though a general distinction can in fact be
drawn meaningfully on the basis of what is the case under normal circumstances.
2 (Q3) and (Q4) describe the entangled states typical of quantum mechanics,
for which it is true that the component particles have identical probabilities for
measurement outcomes, but it is also certain that these outcomes will be one the
opposite of the other.
3 As will be seen in what follows, the seeming awkwardness of this question
rests on the tacit assumption that in all the statistically relevant states there always
is a property possessed by each particle as its property.
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Saunders rejects both the claim that classical indistinguish-
ability is incoherent (Bach, 1997; Van Kampen, 1984) and that it is
unnecessary (Ehrenfest & Trkal, 1920; Van Kampen, 1984), and
contends that
indistinguishability (permutability, invariance under permuta-
tions) makes just as much sense classically as it does in
quantum mechanics (Saunders, 2006, p. 200)
and indeed we should infer from the evidence that both classical
and quantum particles are statistically indistinguishable.
On the basis of this assumption of indistinguishability,
Saunders provides his explanation for the statistics. The difference
between classical and quantum statistics, he contends (Saunders,
2006, p. 203), is due to the breakdown, as CkbNk, of the approxi-
mation
ðNk þ Ck  1Þ!
Nk!ðCk  1Þ!
 C
Nk
k
Nk!
ð1Þ
(with Ck denoting the number of cells in the kth frequency range,
and Nk the particles that lie in region k). Such a breakdown is,
in turn, entirely determined by the fact that the equilibrium
measure is continuous in classical phase space, and discrete in
Hilbert space. This is to say, roughly put, that while every point in
configuration space is equally available to classical particles,
quantum particles only occupy specific ‘areas’, and tend to ‘group
together’ in ways directly mirrored by the statistics.
Saunders’ suggestion is, then, that in order to account for the
difference between classical and quantum statistics, a tu quoque
argument in favor of classical indistinguishability (which finds
support in Gibbs’ paradox) just needs to be supplemented by a
consideration about probability measures that does not entail
anything concerning particle identities. It follows that the Saunders
line of reasoning constitutes an alternative to the Received View.
There are at least two difficulties with this sort of argument.
First, the assumption of classical statistical indistinguishability
is not uncontroversial.4 Secondly, an ontological account of the
nature and behavior of what is being described, going beyond a
mere claim that there is a difference in probability measures, may
still be legitimately demanded. Why are the probability measures
different in the classical and quantum case? Why, more
importantly, are only (anti-)symmetric, permutation-invariant
states allowed for quantum systems?
2.2. Equiprobability and the fundamental postulate of statistical
mechanics
While Saunders’ explanation of quantum statistics rests on the
assumption that all particles, classical and quantum, are indis-
tinguishable, the reverse possibility was explored by Belousek’s
(2000), aiming to undermine the very assumption of quantum
indistinguishability.
Belousek argues that whether quantum systems truly are
permutation invariant depends on whether it is correct to assume
the Fundamental Postulate of Statistical Mechanics (FPSM)—
according to which every distinct equilibrium configuration must
be assigned the same statistical weight—in the framework of
quantum mechanics. Such an assumption, Belousek claims, is by
no means inescapable. In actual fact, he argues, quantum particles
can legitimately be regarded as distinguishable and, consequently,
as individuals.
As shown by Tersoff and Bayer (1983), one can derive quantum
statistics under a hypothesis of uniformly random a priori
distribution of statistical weights over all possible microstates of
the system, including states only differing by permutations. Just
by assuming, in agreement with the basic axioms of probability,
that each state is given a probability between 0 and 1, and that the
sum over the probabilities for all states is 1, Tersoff and Bayer
show that the observed statistical distributions correspond to the
average over these random probabilities. Therefore, while given
FPSM an assumption of distinguishability accounts for (MB)
statistics and one of indistinguishability for quantum statistics,
it is possible to obtain (BE) and (FD) statistics for distinguishable
quantum particles by denying FPSM and postulating a random a
priori distribution instead. In particular, if one gives up FPSM one
can claim that the same number of states is in fact available to
classical and quantum many-particle systems (although, ob-
viously enough, with different probabilities).
FPSM is generally taken to hold because, in absence of any
specific information about the system, it seems natural to think
that it could be in any of the available states with the same
probability. FPSM is therefore rooted in the Principle of Indiffer-
ence. However, Belousek points out, the latter is itself object
of philosophical debate, and far from obviously compelling. As a
matter of fact, an assumption of random a priori probabilities may
legitimately be regarded as logically weaker than one of equal a
priori probabilities. Consequently, there is room for abandoning
FPSM and claiming that quantum particles are distinguishable
individual objects.5
This line of argument has the advantage, compared to the
alternative exemplified by Saunders, that it grounds the defense of
particle individuality on the well-understood concept of distin-
guishability. For this reason, it may prima facie appear quite
appealing. Unfortunately, however, there are problems concerning
both the explanatory efficacy of the proposal and its general
plausibility.
First, even if one accepts that (although this fact is ‘masked’ by
randomness in the distribution of probabilities) particle ex-
changes do in fact give rise to new macrostates in the quantum
domain, the problem that non-symmetric states are never
observed remains. Moreover, as Teller and Redhead (2000) point
out, once some information about the physical system being
described is available interference terms arise that make uniform
priors necessary. An alternative theory based on non-uniform
priors, they argue following Van Fraassen (1991, esp. pp. 417–418),
has not been shown to exist, and appears indeed difficult to
develop. For, since the assumption of distinguishability basically
amounts to the positing of definite pre-measurement values for
the individual particles, such a theory would seem to be in direct
conflict with Bell-type no-go theorems.
2.3. State-accessibility restrictions
Some authors (see, for the first explicit statements of the view,
French, 1989; French & Redhead, 1988) suggest that in order to
defend the individuality of quantum particles it is sufficient
to postulate certain primitive and non-further-explicable state-
accessibility restrictions. Systems of indistinguishable particles,
on this construal, are never found in non-symmetric states just
because this is a fundamental feature of the world, in the same
way as, say, the existence of quantum entangled states or the fact
4 The (dis-)solution of Gibbs’ paradox might be interpreted—contrary to what
Saunders suggests—as suggesting the need to switch from classical mechanics as
traditionally understood to the non-classical ontological setting of quantum
mechanics.
5 In general, Belousek claims, quantum indistinguishability is conventional in
the sense that it depends on a subjective choice between observationally
equivalent hypotheses. For present purposes, however, Belousek’s conventionalist
conclusion can be ignored.
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that fermions obey the Exclusion Principle. Indeed, if the initial
condition is imposed that the state is either symmetric or anti-
symmetric and there are no transitions from a state of one kind to
a state of the other kind, then only one of two possibilities ((BE)
or (FD) statistics) is open to any quantum system. In particular, if
symmetrisation is a boundary condition, permutation symmetry
is necessary to guarantee symmetry conservation. Consequently,
the fact that ‘one particle in each state’ arrangements have half
the probability in the quantum domain that they have classically
is explained: it is just due to the fact that only symmetric
(respectively, anti-symmetric) entangled states are ever available
to bosons (respectively, fermions).
The crucial question is, of course, whether the conjectured
restrictions onwhat is possible and/or onwhat is true at the level of
initial conditions can be accepted as such. Some, like Huggett
(1995), maintain that it is explanatory enough to claim that non-
symmetric states are simply not in the symmetrised Hilbert space
that correctly represents the actual world. One may object, however,
that this line of reasoning refuses to seek explanations in cases in
which it is legitimate to ask for them. Using the analogy provided by
Teller (1998), for example, the view of quantum particles as
individuals is unable to say why the world is described by a
symmetrised Hilbert space, while statistical mechanics can explain,
or at least attempt to explain, why a state of affairs in which a cold
cup of tea spontaneously starts to boil is never observed. In view of
this, one may argue, the interpretation of quantum statistics based
on the Received View should be accepted in virtue of the fact that it
is more explanatory (not doing so would be analogous to just taking
facts of thermodynamics as primitive).
Furthermore, Redhead and Teller (1991, 1992) argue that there
is the additional difficulty that non-symmetric states in quantum
mechanics appear to be in principle useless (in Redhead’s (1975)
terminology) surplus structure. Redhead and Teller suggest that,
in view of the presence of such surplus structure, the use of the
Fock space formalism of quantum field theory is to be preferred
as—unlike the Hilbert space formalism—it does not make use of
particle ‘labels’ and simply cannot describe non-symmetric state.
The use of Fock spaces, however, (claim Redhead and Teller)
appears to invite us to dispense not only with the labels, but with
what they express at the ontological level too: namely, particle
identities.
It could be countered, following French and Krause (2006,
pp. 193–197), that Redhead and Teller’s argument is not compel-
ling because there is a tension between the undeniable heuristic
role of surplus structure in physics and the use of it as a basis for
setting negative constraints on one’s ontological beliefs. Also, one
might want to deny that the use of the Fock space formalism has
any ontological significance, as the latter formalism meshes as
well with an ontology of individual particles as with one of fields
with non-individual ‘excitations’. More strongly, it has been
argued that it is a theorem of Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory that
labels can be unambiguously assigned to each one of a group
of countable objects, and so French and Teller’s argument is
formally mistaken (see Muller & Saunder, 2008, p. 526).
In any event, it remains a fact that non-symmetric states are
not observed in quantum mechanics, while they are observed
classically. And that the postulation of primitive restrictions and
constraints on the evolution of physical systems as an explanation
of this fact does not seem satisfactory, and could in fact
considered rather ad hoc.
2.4. No metaphysics from physics?
A completely different reaction to the allegedly problematic
evidence under discussion is presented by Huggett in a series of
works (1995, 1997, 1999). Huggett argues that the idea that
particle permutations should make a difference if particles were
individuals depends on a supposition as to the truth of haecceit-
ism: namely, the metaphysical doctrine according to which
possible worlds can differ de re without differing qualitatively.
That is, differ exclusively with respect to which object is which
and/or which object possesses which property.6 However, says
Huggett, haecceitism is by no means necessary for individuality.
In classical statistical mechanics, he contends, once realistic
physical systems are taken into consideration it is equally possible
to adopt a representation in terms of ‘distribution space’ (i.e., a
description of what properties are instantiated where) and of
‘phase space’ (i.e., the canonical description in terms of indivi-
duals with properties). However, only the latter is wedded to
haecceitism. Since, in any event, we do not put into question the
metaphysical status of classical particles as individuals, it follows
that no metaphysical consequences should be drawn from our
theories, and in particular from the abstract space one decides to
work in. This leads Huggett to maintain that quantum particles
should not be regarded as non-individuals because of their
indistinguishability: their metaphysical status is, instead, best
regarded as underdetermined by the physics.7
It might seem that Huggett’s attempt to break the very
connection between physical theory and metaphysics could be
exploited by the supporters of the individuality of quantum
particles. To do so, they would just need to isolate what Huggett
says about individuality and haecceitism from his more general
skepticism about the metaphysical import of physics, and use it in
their own framework. In other words, if individuality is the
‘default position’, then the claim that the statistics does not have
metaphysical import may suffice for sticking to the view that
particles are individual objects without the need to provide any
explanation of the evidence related to quantum statistics.
Teller (2001) and Gordon (2002), though, correctly point out that
the evidence mentioned by Huggett bears witness only to the fact
that more ‘incomplete’ descriptions are sufficient in the classical
domain; and that it is far from clear that Huggett’s claims about the
‘metaphysical neutrality’ of physical theory are straightforwardly
extendable to quantum mechanical systems. In particular, it is not
at all clear that the two descriptions of many-particle systems
(with and without haecceitistic differences) are available in the
quantum domain. As we have seen, the only existing proposal for
making permutations of particles without a qualitative effect on the
macrostate count statistically in the quantum case—that is, the
Tersoff–Bayer/Belousek proposal-faces undeniable difficulties.
It is therefore legitimate to think that Huggett’s ‘metaphysical
agnosticism’ is not particularly convincing, at least as far as the
quantum domain is concerned. And that quantum statistics does
in fact require an explanation, and if one does not want it to be
based on non-individuality, one should not be too satisfied with
the present situation.
3. A new suggestion
It seems that those who intend to defend the position
according to which quantum particles are individuals from the
threat represented by quantum statistics must make a precise
metaphysical claim about the particles themselves. Such a claim
must account both for the particles’ ‘tendency to group together’
in permutation-symmetric arrangements and for the impossibility
6 And, it would also seem, at least if properties are not universals, which
property-instance is which.
7 Notice the contrast between Huggett’s ‘neutrality’ and Saunders’ positive
claim that both classical and quantum particles are indistinguishable.
M. Morganti / Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 40 (2009) 223–231226
Author's personal copy
ARTICLE IN PRESS
of non-symmetric states (and, therefore, for the irrelevance of
haecceitism).
In the rest of the paper, it will be argued that this can be done
by giving up an assumption that has been tacitly presupposed
so far but is not, despite appearances, indispensable: namely, that
everything qualitative about a particle must be encoded in a
property that it possesses as its property. The claim will be put
forward that in quantum many-particle systems of identical
particles state-dependent properties are always properties that
belong exclusively to the whole system. That is, that quantum
statistics describes properties that have nothing to do with the
identities of the components of the whole, as they are ‘inherent’
properties of the whole itself. This means, it will be argued, that
the states described by the statistics are indeed insensitive to
permutations, but this does not point to the fact that in actuality
there are no permuted elements as particles lack definite
identities. By the same token, the (anti-)symmetry of the relevant
states is explained by denying that those states describe anything
more than a disposition of the system to give rise to certain
correlated outcomes upon measurement.
The rest of the paper will thus be devoted to providing the
reader with two things:
(i) A definition of the view of properties being put forward, with
reference to the proposal closest to it that can be found in the
philosophical literature about quantum mechanics: Paul
Teller’s ‘relational holism’.
(ii) A precise account of quantum statistics on the basis of the
ontological perspective so defined.
3.1. Holism, inherence and identity
It is commonly claimed that quantum entanglement is a form
of holism, the latter consisting, to use the typical slogan, of the
fact that ‘the whole is more than the sum of the parts’.
Teller (1986, 1989), in particular, designates as particularism
the view that the world is composed of individuals possessing
non-relational properties, and relations among which are ‘re-
ducible’ to their non-relational properties. Reducibility is intended
here in the sense that relations are nothing over and above
(a subset of) the non-relational properties of their relata taken
together: for example, the holding of the relation ‘is taller than’
between Alice and Bob just is the fact that Alice has a specific
height (different from Bob’s) plus the fact that Bob has a specific
height (different from Alice’s). Teller claims that the differences
between classical and quantum mechanics are due to the fact that
particularism is true of the entities dealt with at the level of the
former, but not of those described by the latter. In the quantum
domain, Teller argues, one must endorse relational holism: that is,
the view that certain properties of the total system are irreducible
relations that are not equal to a ‘sum’ of properties of the system’s
component parts. Teller calls these relations ‘inherent’. In
particular, Teller considers as a reason to embrace relational
holism the failure of factorizability for entangled states8 and the
related, experimentally confirmed violations of Bell’s inequalities
(Teller, 1989, esp. pp. 214–215).
Teller’s perspective is the starting point for the rest of the
present article. The idea that will be put forward is, in effect, little
more than an ‘extension’, or ‘generalisation’, of relational holism:
it is the idea that the holistic view based on the notion of inherence
must be extended to non-entangled systems. That is, from states like
(Q3) and (Q4) above, already dealt with in holistic terms by Teller
(and others), to (Q1) and (Q2), a holistic understanding of which,
it is contended, provides a solution to the puzzles raised by
quantum statistics.
Of course, only in entangled states is the overall state non-
factorizable in terms of separate states of the components. But
non-factorizability is not a necessary condition for holism. And
indeed, once holism has been acknowledged to hold for some
quantum systems, one seems justified in accepting it also for
other quantum systems insofar as doing so solves existing
conceptual problems.
Before moving on, one significant remark needs to be made,
and a bit more about the type of properties assumed to play the
key role must be said.
Quite importantly, the ‘relational’ label will be dropped inwhat
follows, as it is not essential for present purposes. The claim will
be that in all many-particle systems of identical quantum
particles, the state-dependent properties of the particles ‘merge’
into an inherent, holistic property of the whole. As will be
illustrated shortly, the fact that the latter conveys information
about the components of the whole need not be interpreted as
entailing that such property is a relation. Hence, holism will
be endorsed, and it will be left open whether it is relational or
otherwise, in what follows.9
As for the notion of an inherent property, it will be taken to be
a property P with the following characteristics:
(i) P is the property of a whole constituted of simpler
components;
(ii) If P is a property of the whole composed of parts a and b,
P is not reducible to separate intrinsic properties of a and b.
(iii) If P is a property of the whole composed of parts a and b,
it is not necessary for P to contain information about a and b
only if it also contains ‘non-trivial’ specific information about
a and b separately.
Point (i) explicitly makes holism an integral part of the concept
of inherence. As mentioned, the concept of reducibility in play
in (ii) has to do with the fact that the possession of
an inherent property by a whole does not just consist of
the possession of certain non-relational properties by the
components of that whole. Inherence can thus be regarded as
the denial of mereological supervenience for properties, and the
creation of a ‘higher-level’ property as certain parts constitute
a whole (it, therefore, involves at least some aspects of what is
known as ‘emergence’).
Seeing what (iii) means requires putting an essential disposi-
tional element into the picture. Think, for example, of a two fair
coin system about to be tossed, and a powerful demon who has
decided to make the coins land on the same side—which one s/he
will decide an instant after the toss. In this scenario, a disposition
of the system to evolve so that the two coins will land on the same
side can be attributed to the two-coin whole as an irreducible
inherent property. This property describes what will happen to
the individual coins, and so it is about the coins; however, it does
not say anything specific about each specific coin—except for the
fact that each coinwill land on the same side as the other, which is
‘trivial’ in the sense that it follows from (and does not contribute to
8 That is, the fact that it is not the case that, for two entangled particles A and
B, PrAB(x,yji,j,l) ¼ PrA(xji,l)PrB(yjj,l), where ‘x’ and ‘y’ are the outcomes of
measurements of the same observable for A and B, respectively, ‘i’ and ‘j’ the
setup of the measuring apparatuses, and l the pair’s state before measurement,
which may encode some ‘hidden variables’.
9 It is interesting to notice that if the inherent property is not a relation, then
particularism as defined by Teller is not violated by quantum systems. Also notice
the connection between this and the debate about individuality: if the inherent
property is a relation, then room is made for the view of identical particles
(fermions, at least) as ‘relationals’ in the sense of Muller & Saunders (2008).
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establish) a fact about the whole (notice that the demon’s decision
affects the coin pair directly, not via separate decisions about the
individual coins). In a word, (iii) says that certain inherent
properties (call them ‘holistic’) contain information about the
parts of the whole exhibiting them without also containing the
sort of information about the parts that can instead be expected to
be available in what, following Teller, one may call the classical
particularist setting. This feature of inherent properties, it is
claimed here, is the key to understanding quantum statistics,
exactly because it identifies the respect in which the quantum
domain (and its statistics) differs from the classical one (and its
statistics).
It is this holistic aspect of inherence, in particular, that has to
do with the symmetry features, exhibited by quantum many-
particle systems, that seem to call for a non-individual-based
ontology: to put it simply, the statistically relevant properties of
many-particle systems of quantum identical particles are inherent
properties possessed by those systems as unitary wholes; as such,
and in view of their essential dispositional aspect—peculiar to the
quantum domain10—they describe the many-particle systems
they belong to without saying anything about the specific
particles, and only conveying information about (correlated)
future measurement outcomes; hence, in a way that is insensitive
to permutations of the particles (compare with the demon
scenario).
Given the foregoing, the hypothesis can be made explicit that
the inherent properties exhibited by quantum many-particle systems
are the unique cause of the peculiarities of quantum statistics and,
consequently, one does not need to question the particles’
individuality, nor to revise one’s understanding of probability
distributions. But let us see this in more detail.
3.2. Inherent properties and quantum statistics
Statistics can generally be intended as a description of possible
measurement outcomes. It is a widely shared opinion that in
quantum mechanics the latter (in the majority of cases) do not
uncover already possessed properties but rather determine the
possession of actual properties. One might insist that measure-
ments actualize certain propensities of quantum systems by
making dispositions ‘evolve into’ actual (‘categorical’) properties,11
or go in the opposite direction and attempt to reduce all
dispositions to categorical bases. As mentioned (footnote 10),
we can leave this as it stands, without embarking on a
detailed discussion of dispositions. What is important to stress
is the peculiar significance that the measurement-relatedness
of statistical descriptions acquires in the case of quantum
statistics.
Let us start by using again the familiar example of the two
coins. Since these are classical objects, a property of the two-coin
whole such as, for instance, ‘one heads and one tails’ is always
reducible to two monadic intrinsic properties (‘heads’ and ‘tails’)
possessed by the coins separately on each specific coin toss.12 As a
consequence, the property of the whole conveys information
about which coin is in which state, and thus also includes a
reference to specific identities. This entails that there are two
ways in which the ‘one heads and one tails’ property can be
possessed.
However, if it were possible to have the ‘one heads and one
tails’ property of the two-coin system without having separate
properties for the two coins (imagine the former property being a
fundamentally ‘dispositional aspect’ not reducible to facts about
the particles, in a way analogous to what happened in the earlier
example of the powerful demon), then the property in question
would be an inherent property of the whole that would be about
the coins as parts of that whole without saying anything about
any specific coin. A direct consequence of this would be that only
one possible system would correspond to that property, as there
would be only one way to exemplify it. Hence, unlike in the case of
the ‘fully classical’ coins, switching the coins would not give rise to a
new total state. Yet, crucially, the individuality of the coins would
not be put into question.
This, the main claim of this paper is, is exactly what happens in
the case of quantum many-particle systems of identical particles.
For these, the statistics only describes what measurement results
are possible for what systems. And, crucially, this description
concerns inherent, pre-measurement holistic dispositional prop-
erties that contain no information about the individual particles.
Hence, it should come as no surprise that, although the particles
are individuals—and, therefore, it makes sense to ask which one
will be in which state after measurement this is not something
that one should look for in the pre-measurement situations
described by the statistics. Indeed, for quantum many-particle
systems one only has statistical information about the particles in
the form (assuming again two-components and two-values
systems) ‘1 and 2 will (be measured to)—or would (if measur-
ed)—have the same value for property P, namely, x’ or ‘1 will
(be measured to)—or would (if measured)—have opposite value to
2 for property P’. These qualitative descriptions too, including the
first (see (Q1) and (Q2) above), can perfectly be taken to
correspond to inherent properties understood as illustrated above.
(This can of course be extended to all systems, independently
of the number of their individual components: to see how, one
just needs to conceive of the right sort of inherent properties
describing possible measurement outcomes).
The proposed conjecture thus entails
(A) That for all many-particle systems and state-dependent
properties particle exchanges do not give rise to new
arrangements (i.e., the identities of the particles are not
statistically relevant) not because particles are not individuals
and consequently do not have well-defined identities. Rather,
because the particles’ identities do not play any role in the
determination of the states that are described by the statistics.
(B) That one should not expect ‘quantum analogues’ of classical
states such as (C4) (i.e., non-symmetric quantum states)
to exist, because these would require a property-structure
different from the one that—it is being claimed—is exhibited
by quantum systems. That is, they would require specific values
for observables corresponding to monadic state-dependent
10 No commitment to any strong view on dispositions is implied here, but only
a weaker claim to the effect that in quantum mechanics measurement plays a
crucial role. Emphasising that the theory tells us how certain systems will evolve
upon measurement given the laws of nature is perfectly compatible, for instance,
with Strawson’s (2008) claim that there are no dispositions as everything that is
real (including, therefore, causally relevant properties) is categorical. The scenario
being suggested is also compatible with the opposite idea, examined among others
by Blackburn (1990) and Holton (1999), that reality is essentially dispositional.
Hence, intermediate positions are also allowed. In any event, there is no need to
take a stance here.
11 Work in favour of a dispositionalist, propensity-based, understanding of
quantum properties was done by Popper (1957). For a more recent example, see
Suarez (2007).
12 Of course, this does not hold for the property ‘one heads and one tails’
intended as a description of any one outcome in a set of trials. What is important
here, however, is the description of the ontological scenario behind each specific
actual trial (thanks to an anonymous referee for emphasising the need to
distinguish a result in a series of trials from the description of a specific real
system).
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properties of individual particles, which however, simply do
not exist before measurement.
Point (A) should appear clear enough given the foregoing
discussion. It accounts for the permutation symmetry of quantum
many-particle systems. A way to explain what point (B) exactly
amounts to is the following. If holism is true of all quantummany-
particle systems, it means that the correspondence between states
(C1) and (C2) on the one hand and states (Q1) and (Q2) on the
other is only an appearance due to the formalism.13 While the
former two effectively are states in which each particle is
in a determinate state (i.e., possesses a value for the property
under consideration as its own property), the latter two are
instead states in which there is an emergent property
of the composite system but no determinate states for the
components, exactly in the same way as in the states described
by (Q3) and (Q4). Clearly, if one only has inherent, holistic
properties, states attributing equal values to the components
((Q1) and (Q2)) are unsurprisingly, and necessarily, ‘complemen-
ted’ by states describing ‘opposite value’ correlations, i.e., by
entangled states ((Q3) and (Q4)), and not by non-symmetric
ones.14
It can thus be concluded that the hypothesis that all
statistically relevant properties of quantum many-particle sys-
tems are holistic properties inherent to the whole explains the
peculiar features of quantum statistics while steering clear of the
Received View on particle (non-)individuality. In fact, the
explanation of quantum statistics suggested heremust be deemed
satisfactory if an account based on non-individuality is. Because
the former differs from the latter only with respect to ‘where
particle identity is taken out of the picture’, so to speak: i.e., in the
‘content’ of the relevant properties (the state-dependent proper-
ties of many-particle systems) rather than in the property-bearers
(the particles themselves).
4. Further remarks
An important question concerns when exactly many-particle
systems exhibit inherent properties. An answer is, of course,
easily given in the case of entangled systems: for them, interaction
between separate particles gives rise to a radically new entity,
with completely new features—most notably, as we have
seen, the non-factorizability of the total state. The inherent
property is then just identical with the anti-correlation among
the measurement outcomes for the separate particles which
was not present before interaction. For non-entangled
systems, however, this is not the case, and the postulated inherent
property conveys exactly the same information as would be
contained in intrinsic properties of the separate particles
considered together That is, recalling non-entangled state-types
(Q1) and (Q2)
jx41jx42 ðQ1Þ
jy41jy42; ðQ2Þ
there is nothing that can be said (in terms of future measurement
outcomes) about particles 1 and 2 in these two-particle states that
would not also be true if the particles constituted two separate
one-particle states (i.e., jx41 and jx42 and jy41 and jy42)—and
vice versa. Yet, in the two-particle case we are attributing an
inherent property to the whole while denying that the two
components have actual properties before measurement; and in
the one-particle case we want to deny the existence of the
inherent property (there is no whole it can be attributed to) while
allowing for the possibility that the particles already are in state x
or y before measurement. The risk exists, therefore, that simply by
describing two or more particles as composing a unique whole
(i.e., simply by describing them via the appropriate tensor product
in Hilbert space) one is forced, on the present construal, to see
monadic intrinsic properties ceasing to exist and making room for
holistic, inherent properties.
The answer is that for non-entangled systems too it is
interaction that gives rise to ‘genuine wholes’. If there is no
interaction, the use of the tensor product formalism just leads to
the employment of the same linguistic expression for different
ontological scenarios—with and without inherent properties of
the whole respectively (notice, at any rate, that measurement
outcomes are the same in the two cases).15
More details can be added on the basis of subjective
preferences, for example suggesting that particles ‘always’ con-
stitute wholes, for irreducible relations are ubiquitous. In any
event, it does not appear necessary to deal with these issues
further here.
One may dislike an ontology according to which inherent
relations invariably emerge in quantum many-particle systems
out of particles that possess separate monadic properties when-
ever they ‘exist on their own’. However, the fact of inherence
being pointed at should be regarded (at least if one agrees with
the core of Teller’s holist interpretation of the theory) as some-
thing peculiar to the quantum domain in general, and the present
proposal simply extends to other systems claims that are already
widely accepted for certain physical composites (i.e., entangled
systems). If an explanation must be sought at all, it must regard
the nature of entanglement in general rather than (or at least
before) the present suggestion concerning quantum statistics.
Surely, one may claim that holism is justified for entangled
systems in view of their violation of factorizability. But, as argued
earlier, one may also take the peculiar nature of statistics as
equally in need of explanation, and the rejection of classical
particularism and invocation of inherent properties to represent a
readily available explanation for this.
Moving on to other types of worries, one may object that this
proposal retains particle identity in name only, as properties do
not, strictly speaking, belong to individuals anymore, while
classically the whole point of attributing individuality to things
is to say which objects have which properties. Reiterating claims
already made at the beginning of the paper, it must first of all be
responded to this that it was not the aim of this paper to defend
the individuality of quantum particles directly, nor to provide
arguments for or against any specific view of individuality.
Moreover, first, particles are certainly attributed well-defined
state-independent properties, that is, specific instances of the
essential properties that make them individuals of a certain kind.
These can certainly be deemed sufficient for the particles’
individuality: it just requires not assuming the Identity of the
Indiscernibles as a criterion of individuation (primitive thisness/
haecceitas for properties or objects is always an option). Secondly,
if it is correct to claim (following Muller & Saunders, 2008) that
quantum particles are weakly discernible thanks to irreflexive
13 At least insofar as (Q1) and (Q2) and similar expressions describe genuine
wholes produced by physical interaction. See the first remark in the next section.
14 Recall the footnote towards the beginning of the paper pointing out the role
played by a ‘tacit assumption’—that there always exist separate properties for
separate particles—in the identification of the impossibility of non-symmetric
states as a problem.
15 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing out this potential problem
deriving from the formalism, as well as the need to say something about the
dynamics according to which inherent properties ‘emerge’.
M. Morganti / Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 40 (2009) 223–231 229
Author's personal copy
ARTICLE IN PRESS
relations holding between them, then, far from making indivi-
duality empty, this proposal (of course, once inherent properties
are understood as relations) appears in line with the most recent
‘empiricist-oriented’ attempts to show that quantum mechanics
does not in fact force us to give up particle individuality.
Therefore, only by insisting that it is monadic state-dependent
empirical properties that ought to individuate physical systems
can one pursue this line of criticism; but such an insistence
appears difficult to justify. Indeed, it would amount to sticking to
the belief that classical individuality is the only form of
individuality, which would make the whole enterprise of under-
standing quantum statistics on grounds other than non-indivi-
duality and quantum field theory a non-starter—which, in the
present view, it clearly is not.16
In a different vein, one might insist on the presence of in
principle meaningless surplus structure in the formalism of
quantum mechanics. The following response could in that case
be given: it can equally be maintained that classical mechanics is
inadequate as a description of the objects in its domain because it
is possible to describe the latter entities as entangled but
entangled states are never realised in the classical world. In
general, given any physical theory and its formalism, it is always
possible to ‘cook up’ some form of surplus structure. In fact, what
counts as surplus structure is not immediately determined given a
set of statements/formulas, and ontological presuppositions are
fundamental for interpreting the theory. This is essentially the
reason why it is contended here that the ontological explanation
provided in this paper succeeds where talk of inexplicable state-
accessibility restrictions fails.17
Moving to the theory and its interpretation, another concern
may arise. The first regards the relation between operators, states
and properties. Usually, the Eigenstate–Eigenvalue link is assumed
in employing the quantum theory, according to which a physical
system actually possesses the property corresponding to a specific
value for an observable if it is in an eigenstate for that observable
corresponding to that value. This licenses inferences such as
Probðparticle x has property P with value v Þ ¼ 1) Particle x
actually has property P with value v ð2Þ
However, it was denied earlier that in states such as, for
instance, (Q1) one has two particles each actually possessing a
specific value for the given observable as an intrinsic property: the
consequent in the above conditional must thus be deemed false.
But in such states, the component particles have probability 1 of
being detected as having that property: the antecedent is true.
Therefore, the Eigenstate–Eigenvalue Link seems to be made
invalid by the present proposal. The response to this might simply
be generally to restrict the applicability of the Eigenstate–Eigen-
value Link to the total system. A better response is, however, that
the Eigenstate–Eigenvalue link only applies to observables, and in
the systems under consideration only symmetric operators
related to the total system count as observables, and the operators
corresponding to the single-particle properties are consequently
excluded from the rule.18
One last point, which just needs to be mentioned, concerns
standard quantum mechanics in comparison to its competitors.
One could claim that interpretations/theories alternative to
standard quantum mechanics (in particular, Bohmian Mechanics)
also explain the statistics while preserving the idea that particles
are individuals and so one does not need to consider this nth
proposed modification to the theory. It is obvious, however, that
standard quantum mechanics was assumed here as the default
choice, and that the modification of the usual interpretation
suggested—although non-negligible—is not so radical that it
implies the departure from standard quantum mechanics. Hence,
that a working explanation of quantum statistics along the
suggested lines is available should in fact be regarded as
something positive by all those who are not attracted, for
independent reasons, by interpretations/theories other than
standard quantum mechanics.
5. Conclusions
While the characteristics of quantum statistics are readily
explained by giving up the idea that particles possess well-defined
identities, on the conception of quantum particles as individual
objects they represent a problem. Existing proposals alternative to
the non-individuality view impute the difference in available
states between classical and quantum statistics either to primitive
restrictions on what states are accessible to what systems, or to
peculiar facts about the probabilities with which the possible
states occur in the quantum domain. However, the former type of
explanation is little more than a transformation of the proble-
matic evidence into a supposedly fundamental fact. The latter,
instead, calls into play alleged differences in probability distribu-
tions between the classical and the quantum in a way that either
does not work, or explains only partially, or is connected to
other independent assumptions (i.e., the indistinguishability of all
particles) that one may prefer not to make. The alternative to all
this seems to be a form of skepticism regarding the metaphysical
import of physics. Steering clear of this skepticism, but also of the
non-individuality account of quantum statistics, a new alternative
has been suggested in this paper, based on the conjecture that the
peculiarities of quantum statistics are due to the fact that, unlike
in the classical case—in which the statistics generally describes
actual monadic properties of individual particles—what is
described in the quantum case are inherent dispositional proper-
ties of the whole. It is hoped that this perspective on quantum
statistics will be regarded as a plausible option worth exploring in
more detail in future discussions.
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